On Wednesday, November 9, 2011, Sir Elton John announced a new charity project in Kyiv to help homeless women receive access to HIV and AIDS treatment. The project is being launched in partnership with the Ukrainian businesswoman Elena Pinchuk (the wife of the Ukrainian steel magnate and philanthropist Viktor Pinchuk), and it is targeted at homeless and street-involved girls and young women between the ages of 14 and 24. In particular, it aims to reach graduates of orphanages and vocational schools, residents of crisis shelters, women who have recently been incarcerated, and those working in the sex industry. The goal is to provide them with access to HIV testing as well as vital social, medical, and legal assistance.

The first project of this kind was initiated at the end of May 2007, when Elena Franchuk’s ANTIAIDS Foundation launched the new program “On The Edge” to help combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Ukraine. In the spirit of collaboration, the Viktor Pinchuk Foundation and Elena Franchuk ANTIAIDS Foundation have now pledged a $2.5 million grant towards the five-year program of the Elton John AIDS Foundation in Ukraine.

The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Ukraine is believed to be the worst in Europe. At the beginning of 2010, an estimated 360,000 people aged 15 and older were infected, with a prevalence of 1.3% among 15-49 year olds. Registrations at medical facilities show that only a quarter of all infected people are aware of their status. In contrast, the United Kingdom has an estimated 77,000 HIV positive residents, making up 0.2% of the adult population, with three quarters knowing they are infected. In both Russia and Ukraine, the epidemic is driven by intravenous drug use, with addicts accounting for around half of all cases. Other high risk groups include men who have sex with men, sex workers, prisoners, and street children.

Unfortunately, the Kyiv AIDS clinics, which ‘host’ patients with advanced AIDS and other diseases, especially tuberculosis, are full. It is estimated that less than one-fifth of Ukrainian HIV patients receive anti-retroviral treatment. Progress in treating the patients is very slow, due to political instability, little political commitment to the issue, ignorance, corruption, and an outdated medical and legal system. To make matters worse, the current administration does not seem interested in prevention programs. According to Andriy Klepikov, the head of AIDS Alliance Ukraine, ‘[t]here’s a line in the national AIDS programme budget for prevention, but its value is set at zero’.

Yet perhaps there is light at the end of the tunnel. Ukraine’s government has recently agreed to a co-funding deal with the international organization Global Fund, amounting to $85m over the next two years. To be sure, widespread corruption may affect how much help the patients actually receive. AIDS Alliance claims that the government’s contribution will be spent almost entirely on medical treatment rather than prevention. ‘They usually procure medicines at a higher price than they need to’, says Mr. Klepikov. His suspicion is that kickbacks are at work.

One can only hope that Viktor Yanukovych will stop wasting tax payers’ money on ‘show trials’ and start investing much needed funds in the outdated healthcare industry.

On October 25-26 2011, Ukraine hosted the international conference “Current Trends of Development of National Gender Mechanisms in European Countries,” which took place within the framework of the Ukrainian Chairmanship of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers [1]. The conference, co-organized by the United Nations Development Programme and the Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, bore congenial news to the Ukrainian NGO community. In his opening speech Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister Serhii Tihipko announced the government decision to implement the 40 per cent female quota in Ukraine’s political parties.

The Minister’s concern for increasing women’s representation in Ukrainian politics has been informed by several salient features of the country’s socio-political environment. Ukraine’s commitment to promoting gender equity is attested by the issue’s recent placement under the purview of the Ministry of Social Policy. The urgency of the problem is evident from the fact that in Ukraine there are virtually no women holding positions of political power. In addition to female under-representation in government, the sexist rhetoric of some of Ukraine’s most prominent political figures, which include its president Viktor Yanukovych [2], have fostered a political climate that is inhospitable for women’s active involvement in governmental decision-making. The consequent problem with female empowerment is one of the reasons why, according to the Gender Inequality Index issued by the Human Development Report 2011, Ukraine is ranked only 57th out of 146 surveyed countries [3]. Similarly, due to the fact that for the last twenty years women’s representation in parliament has not managed to rise above 10 per, the Inter-Parliamentary Union database of Women in Parliaments positions Ukraine in the 115th place among 188 countries arranged in descending order [4]. In Ukraine, equal gender participation in politics exists only at the lowest level of governance.

This year’s announcement that the country will implement the gender quota is not the country’s first attempt at instituting reform that would promote female participation in politics. Ukraine has made approximately ten legislative attempts to introduce gender quotas in political parties in the past. Each of these attempts failed and those legal measures that were enacted, such as the 2006 law “On Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities for Men and Women,” contained no mention of gender quotas. Ukraine’s failure to implement measures that would substantively promote gender equity also compromises its international obligations. In particular, Ukraine’s ratification of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, which must be achieved by 2015, entails implementing international norms on gender equality and specifically requires that at least 30 per cent of seats held in political bodies must be held by members of both sexes. This means that in the near future, women’s representation in such governmental bodies as the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers must increase substantially.

Ukraine’s national gender equality experts believe that in order to remedy the contemporary situation of women’s under-representation in Ukrainian Parliament, government legislation implementing gender quotas in political parties would be an appropriate step in the right direction. Such ‘positive actions’ might serve as a temporary tool to overcome discrimination towards women in the political sphere of Ukrainian society. In pursuit of this end, the fulfillment of Mr. Tihipko’s promise would serve as a critical stepping stone. It may be that that his promise was made in view of the upcoming election in 2012 and thus might never materialize. The promotion of women from subordinate and servile to top party positions raises the obvious problem of ensuring that women will hold real and not simply nominal power. While that may be a whole other issue, the first essential step towards greater gender equality is breaking the ‘glass ceiling’ that inhibits many women from advancing to the top of the political ladder. However, one thing is clear: in a democratic society, where women are well-educated and actively involved in the labour market, it is unfair that Ukrainian women are mostly excluded from the political decision-making process at the top levels of government.

[1] http://www.undp.org.ua/en/media/41-democratic-governance/1211-ukrainian-and-european-politicians-and-experts-discuss-current-trends-in-the-development-of-national-gender-equality-mechanisms

[2] http://ukrainewatch.wordpress.com/2011/01/31/yanukovych-invites-to-ukraine-for-sex-tourism/

[3] http://www.undp.org.ua/en/media/45-prosperity-poverty-reduction-and-mdgs/1212-ukraine-is-ranked-76th-out-of-187-countries-the-2011-human-development-report-says

[4] Situation as of 31 August 2011

Fr. Borys Gudziak, Rector of Lviv’s Ukrainian Catholic University, has more than just hope for the future of higher education in Ukraine. He has a mission: “It may sound bold, but we are trying to rethink what it means to be a university in the 21st century.”

The claim is bold, given that UCU presently has just over 500 full-time students. However, with an ever-increasing international profile and a groundbreaking new campus half built, UCU is growing fast.

On a recent fundraising tour in Toronto, Gudziak shared his vision for the direction of this growth.

Ashton Osmak: It has been suggested that UCU is setting the standard for elite education within Ukraine. How so?

Fr. Borys Gudziak: Well, it stems fundamentally from a conviction that every person is created in the image and likeness of God and has a dignity and that dignity has to be recognized and fostered. Ukrainian history has beaten down the person, the human being. We want to help young people really hold their heads high and to be free and responsible.

UCU has 550 full-time students but 170 faculty members, 70 full-time and 100 part-time. The faculty-student ratio is very high – one of the highest, probably, in the world. That personal attention hopefully fosters this sense of human dignity but it also propels a young person to reach their potential, in academic and personal terms.

Learning how to relate in a new way without fear and cynicism helps young people break out of the post-Soviet mold. Ukraine doesn’t have to just overcome its history. People in Ukraine can achieve things in a creative way because of this history. We have thought a lot about the methodology to help people relate better in Ukrainian society or in 21st century post-modern society and that’s why 15 years ago we invited mentally disabled citizens into the heart of the community.

Residential College - L'Arche Wing

They are not a “project” of the university, recipients of a social handout — they are members of our community. Since one of the gifts of people with special needs is that they don’t have masks and facades, they ask one basic question in every relationship and every encounter: can you relate to me, can you love me? That’s the most important question a student can be asked. Do you know how to relate to another person? Do you know how to love another person?

We are now building a dormitory which will be the first in the world to include a community of the mentally disabled, who will be invited as professors of Human Relations. This new residence will house 200 students and eight faculty families. There will be a small community of very young nuns – beautiful, bold, brilliant [nuns]. In Ukrainian there’s a saying that you can steal horses with them: “Можна з ними конi красти”. There is going to be an institute for personal development which will host outstanding personalities from the world at large who want to spend some time with our students.

Within this living/learning centre we want to revolutionize the dormitory experience for students in Ukraine. These are the ideas coming up in Ukraine. Maybe other universities in Toronto, Calgary, Chicago and in Caracas will follow suit?

What about the non-elites? Is there any risk that UCU might become an institution accessible only to a certain stratum of society?

We want to project that risk. We want a particular stratum to be dominant in UCU: adventurous people who are willing to sacrifice in life to serve others and to witness to values. So we’re definitely trying to stratify. Most of our students are from very modest backgrounds. Ninety percent of the students are on financial aid. Almost half of the full-time students don’t pay any tuition. We’re proud of that.

To what extent is UCU shaping or being shaped by the current trend of research on higher education in Ukraine?

Perhaps even more than democracy, what differentiates North America from much of the world is the quality of its higher education institutions. That quality is predicated on great autonomy in universities. That freedom is still lacking in Ukraine.

In some ways we were the most autonomous university in Ukraine because for the first 12 years of our existence our main program was not recognized by the state even though we had international accreditation, which meant that we were free from state control…there’s a Ukrainian saying, “as you make your bed so you will sleep – як постeлиш так будеш спати.” So we had that freedom and we had to have that responsibility.

Ukrainian universities are a bit like McDonald’s outlets. They’re supposed to reproduce the same hamburgers and the Ministry of Education gives the recipe. We are trying to have an integrated, holistic approach where the human being isn’t seen just as a walking brain, but where the social, spiritual, emotional and family aspects are recognized, even catered to.

We also promote a radically different administrative approach. In some universities, which might have 40,000 students and 6,000 employees, literally two or three people have access to information on everything in the university budget. At UCU we have about 300 employees and about 50 people are involved in formulating the budget. There is a principle of subsidiarity at work, which means making decisions at the lowest possible level — not taking everything up to the tsar at the top of the pyramid. That approach is really a spiritual philosophy based on the conviction of the dignity of every person.

Future UCU Campus

We began with nothing, which is a unique opportunity; when you begin with nothing you have nothing to lose. If you dare, you can be very bold. That’s why between ‘92 and ‘94 we spent two years thinking about how to go forward. Instead of running away from Ukraine’s history we dove into it.

Ukrainians met the greatest human challenge of the 20th century – the challenge of furious totalitarianism. The various martyrs and dissidents who did not conform were able to maintain principle in a heroic way and prevailed. The Soviet Union and Soviet leaders are being lost in the oblivion of a dark past while the spiritual principles carried by the lonely heroes are now again attracting many young people.

So we look at these outstanding witnesses to truth and share with students the hypothesis that if they met the greatest challenge of the 20th century and if they were the students of this institution (the Lviv Theological Academy–today UCU) why can’t they meet the greatest challenges of the 21st century, right here in Ukraine?

The bulk of the research institutes at UCU do have a religious focus. How do you envision the relationship between secular and non-secular academic pursuits at UCU?

Much of modernity is predicated on an antagonistic relationship between the sacred and the secular. We are proposing that we can move beyond that hostility. We are in a post-secular age now where people are yearning for a sense of meaning. It’s a pilgrimage, with few set answers.

As we look at families and the difficulty many computer-conditioned young people have in communicating at a dinner table, we see that returning to the heart of human mystery and the heart of the mystery of human life is very important. I am proposing now to the community that we be open to that mystery.

Some of the most formative events for the staff are the manner in which our community comes together [like] when our staff members say farewell to their parents. We had a funeral yesterday for the families of three of our staff. The importance of community solidarity at a time of great need cannot be overemphasized.

We also celebrate new life. Our graduates have real confidence in life. They’re having many children even though they are not particularly well off. I am very inspired by this faith in life in a context where many people are very skeptical about future prospects. So it’s at a very fundamental level that we remain particularly open to the sacred and we are looking for new models, categories, words and symbols to share this pilgrimage.

Where is UCU headed?

Right now we’re in the process of developing our strategy until 2020. We’re opening many new programs: in the social sciences — psychology, sociology…we are considering opening up a school of IT.

Residential UCU College - View from North-West

I hope to work myself out of a job. I’m finishing a term now and probably will have one more five-year term but we are looking to pass the baton on to the next generation of university leaders.

We hope to triple or quadruple student enrollment by 2020. But we abide by a belief that small is beautiful. We have no pretentions at dominating a big Ukrainian context of higher education. There are 150,000 students just in Lviv. We are 1% of the student body and we want to become, let’s say, 2% or 3%, but it’s still going to be a grain of salt; hopefully salt in the leaven.

UCU generates about 30% of the university discourse in Lviv. We hope to continue that. In a good way, we hope to make others jealous so that they will be inspired to do better than we, so that they build better dorms, so that they are more attentive, so that they love each other in their university more than we do.

Today Ukraine’s former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko was arrested. Around 4:00 PM on a Friday afternoon in the middle of summer, in a political trial that has been going on for weeks. The charismatic, photogenic leader of the 2004 Orange Revolution with the braid is now behind bars.

I heard that something was happening while in a taxi, late in the afternoon, after leaving an interview with the editor of one of the country’s reputable newspapers. I was asking her about my research project, on the impact of mass media on collective memory and identity. I had no idea something important had happened, even though I was in the editorial office of a major newspaper. Nothing was mentioned by any of the staff as I was leaving. Once in the cab an announcement came on the radio taxi, informing drivers that the capital city’s main street, Khreshchatyk, was closed because of pro-Tymoshenko protests. My cab driver’s reaction – ‘not again, traffic jams, how much can we be expected to take?’ He needed to get me across town, and the route was through the center, the main street, that was closed. He took an alternative route, up the Andriivs’kyi Uzviz, a historical street which is officially closed to traffic.

On the Khreshchatyk, I saw the protesters. A handful of people, hoarse voices trying to get public attention. I must admit I rushed past them. My beloved cousin from Canada was arriving with his Japanese wife and two small children for a big family visit to our ancestral homeland. I needed to meet them, settle them into their apartment, take them out for dinner, show them the beautiful historical capital city that they had travelled half the world to see.

Once finally home near midnight I checked the news online. Ukrainian media outlets had plenty of video of the arrest, mainly from camera phones. But few details were included in the reports, such as why Tymoshenko was arrested, the time of the arrest, analysis of possible legal ramifications. I was glad to have seen the video but was left with many questions.

One of the videos had a voice shouting, “we are not a ‘banda,’ we are standing up for our rights. ‘Banda.’ A term that I have been coming across in the archives I’ve been plowing through for weeks. The reference in the archives is to another group of people. Generations ago people stood up for themselves and organized a political, and later armed, resistance to the Soviet regime. They called themselves the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during World War II. Soviet authorities called them a ‘banda,’ meaning rabble.

The term also appears in the award winning novel I’m reading, Vasyl’ Shklar’s  Black Raven (Chornyi Voron). It’s about events in a part of Ukraine called Kholodnyi Yar at the end of World War I. Then too people who stood up for themselves and opposed the Bolshevik order that was being imposed upon were called a ‘banda.’ Leonard Cohen’s ‘Everybody Knows’ is playing. ‘Everybody knows the dice are loaded. That’s how it goes.’

I went out on the balcony and looked out into the courtyard. It is uncharacteristically dark tonight. But the stars are out. Shining brightly over the beautiful golden domed city that I love. Tomorrow I will show it to my family, who are here for the first time.

Marta Dyczok, DPhil (Oxon), Associate Professor of History and Political Science in University of Western Ontario, Fellow, Jacyk Programme for the Study of Ukraine, University of Toronto. She has published 3 books, including Media, Democracy and Freedom: The Post Communist Experience (2009, with Oxana Gaman-Golutvina), and in Kyiv for the summer on a research trip.

Elections-2012 have already started in Ukraine. They’re not like EURO-2012, where everybody can see the stadiums and the roads constructed – it’s more like building an iceberg, a common Ukrainian would never see.

Now it’s time for the future MP candidates to hire their team members, to make a research, to consider the price. The puzzle of the future parliament is now being constructed – and this will be one of the biggest dramas in the modern Ukrainian history.

The circumstances are as following: as soon as the football championship is to take place, no rude pressure and direct fraud can be used, so there is a need of more-or-less free and fair elections. As soon, as the Free Trade Zone Agreement with the EU is also negotiated, there’s a need to keep the face of the nowadays power cleaned of the authoritarian image.

First question is the type of electoral system of Ukraine for 2012. Within the Bankova corridors there’s a common acceptance of the mixed system (225 MP’s are to be elected in constituencies, 225 – by means of the countrywide closed proportional party lists). System of this kind worked out really well on the local elections in Autumn 2010, when Party of regions got majority of local MP’s in many used-to-be Tymoshenko-controlled local parliaments. There are also concerns regarding a post-Soviet electoral proverb “The winner is the one who counts the votes, and not the one who wins the votes”, giving the right to count only to the representatives of the parliamentary factions, and the Venice Commission will strongly oppose this.

The ruling power wants to gain a majority in the Rada-2012 (the constitutional majority of 300 MP’s), but this is by any means hardly achievable. That’s why the analists give some small chance to the change of the electoral system into the regional “open party lists”, to get more seats out of controlled oblasts, leaving opposition with no chance to win in most of the Ukraine’s regions.

Another big issue is the people who will be running as the representatives or allies of the ruling power. There’s a deep conflict of interest between Sergiy Lyovochkin, Head of the Administration of the President Yanukovich, and Sergiy Kliuev, Vice-Prime-Minister.

The legendary Kliuev’s “chesspad”, map of 225 constituencies countrywide includes the names of the primary and of the secondary candidate from power, is widely discussed within the Kyiv’s politically engaged community. Primarily “chesspad” term was used as the technology for constructing the Cabinet of Ministers,where the playfield was the key positions within the ministries, regional administrations and the state commities, with primary and secondary candidates for the positions. Now there’s a slight shift of it into the electoral dimension.

According to “legends”, being number 1 within the “chesspad” means the support of the state power, the legendary ugly “administrative resource”, number 2 may count on a “non-involving” attitude. By the end of autumn of 2011 the candidates’ raitings will be checked and the priorities might be shifted.

Still, the “key” of the administrative resource lies in the hands of Lyovochkin, who controls the appointment of the heads of the local (Oblast and Rayon) governmental bodies. This is the part of the “divide et impera” politics of Yanukovich within his own elite, which reminds of the same Kuchma’s approach.

There’s also a desperate fight over the “gerrymandering” of the shares according to the needs of certain players, which are to be set by the Central Election Commitee, completely controlled by pro-Yanukovich people but divided between Kliuev’s and Lyovochkin’s allies.

Will we remember of the violent local elections in Mukacheve in 2004 which were a real rehearsal of the fraud which triggered the Orange Revolution? Will the Donetsk-born elite put the fierceful pressure over the opposition in the way they did 7 years ago, which actually made them lose the game? Or will those people, who set, judge and play the game at the same time, find a simple transparently looking picture suitable for their victory?

Another year, another drama in the never-ending saga of Ukrainian Politics.  But as is the case with any drawn-out television show, at some point or another, people lose interest and stop watching. True, there are always those diehard fans who refuse to miss the latest episode of their favourite television show.  But the fact of the matter is, a show can only remain successful if it reaches a broader audience.  And with Ukraine, it seems that scriptwriters are pulling out all the

stops, but people simply aren’t tuning in anymore.

In 2004, with the now infamous “Orange Revolution,” the Ukrainian Political Drama reached its climax in terms of ratings and international interest.

And how could it not?

There was a clear “antagonist:” the Russian-backed Viktor Yanukovych, who, with the help of his cronies, rigged the presidential elections in hopes of being crowned Ukraine’s next leader.  Thankfully, Viktor Yushchenko paraded in on his western-imported white horse to save Ukraine from the clutches of authoritarianism, corruption, and everything else that comes with it.  It was a typical tale of good versus evil, with an additional element of Cold War inspired “east” versus “west.”  There were mass protests, mysterious poisonings, cameo appearances from famous celebrities, and lots of drama, excitement, and, of course, fireworks.  There was even an official soundtrack to the Orange Revolution (conveniently available for purchase online. http://www.umka.com.ua/eng/catalogue/other/collection-orange-revolution-songs-set-of-2-cds.html)

It was the perfect recipe for a blockbuster hit.

With Yulia Tymoshenko, the giftedly charismatic and equally fashionable “gas princess” by his side, the dynamic democratic duo triumphed over the “evil” Yanukovych to bring Ukraine peace, stability, and European integration.  It was the perfect end to a tumultuous story… or so we thought.  Little did we know, the Ukrainian Political Drama was far from over, and, on the contrary, a sequel was already in the works.

As the years went by, the clear-cut lines between “good” and “evil” blurred into a finger-pointing mess, and what was once a political drama has turned into a farfetched soap opera with unthinkable twists and turns.  Who would have thought five years ago that Yanukovych, the defeated and internationally shamed “villain” of the Revolution, would become the next president of Ukraine?

So where has the story taken us now? Unfortunately, Ukrainian scriptwriters have grown far too accustomed to the Hollywood mantra of “sex [and violence] sells.”  Take, for example, FEMEN (http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2011/apr/15/ukrainian-feminists-topless-campaign).

And who could forget the brawls and smoke bombs in Ukrainian parliament (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8646171.stm)?

More recently, Ukrainian scriptwriters have made yet another faux pas, by recycling old story lines.  Didn’t show trials end with the Soviet Union?  Apparently not, since the braided Iron Lady of Ukraine, Tymoshenko, has found herself sitting in an overcrowded courtroom, tongue-lashing the judge, accusing him of being Yanukovych’s puppet and refusing to stand in his presence.  Meanwhile, hundreds of supporters chant “shame!” both in and outside the courtroom.  (Now cue the violence http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wWcYwMw40T4 and sex http://www.demotix.com/news/730705/femen-hold-rally-titled-its-good-idea-be-tymoshenko-kiev )

It’s a shame that this is what the outside world sees when they tune in to watch Ukraine.

So what are we to expect next? It’s hard to predict.

At the very least, perhaps those of us still watching Ukraine will somehow be able to steer this political drama away from becoming a full-fledged circus, before all interest is gone and the plug is pulled on this show.

Until then, let’s just hope that in a desperate attempt to boost ratings, Tymoshenko doesn’t bring her albino pet tiger “TigrYulia” to court, because at that point, even I will change the channel.  (http://blog.tymoshenko.ua/en/category/my-pets

In 400 BC, Sun Tzu wrote perhaps the most profound sentence about how to win conflicts – “The way to avoid what is strong is to strike what is weak.” If anyone in the Yanukovych administration had bothered to read the works of the great Chinese strategist, they could perhaps have discouraged the president and his colleagues from putting Yulia Tymoshenko on trial. For the Yanukovych regime has made a fundamental error – they have struck what is strong.

 “The way to avoid what is strong is to strike what is weak.”

It has been obvious for a long time that Tymoshenko’s biggest strength as a politician is her charisma and her oratory. Where she has always been weak is in policy and her own dubious record in both business and government. But by putting her on trial the Yanukovych regime played to her strength. Tymoshenko’s strategy from the first day of her trial was to use her considerable oratorical skills to turn the trial into a kind of theatre, where she plays the crusading oppositionist fighting alone against the might of the corrupt state and its authoritarian president. She’s been successful in accomplishing this. She has rightly ascertained that there is no respect among the citizenry for Ukrainian courts or the Ukrainian justice system, and made this the cornerstone of her defense. Her daily verbal harangues of the inexperienced and, frankly, somewhat inadequate judge Rodion Kireyev leave him exasperated; several times he has lost control of his temper. The heavy-handed tactics that the Gryphon special forces use against MPs from her Bloc only exacerbate the image of a state-sponsored political trial. It got so bad that the court finally had to rule to stop live broadcasting of the proceedings; this, however, has changed little, since journalists can still attend the court sessions, and information about what is happening there is freely available.

If the goal of the trial was to finally destroy Tymoshenko’s political career, the regime has failed miserably. They have not only significantly improved her ratings, they have also painted themselves into a corner – no matter what they do next they will come out looking bad, and she will come out looking good. They have several options, each worse than the next -

1. They can find her guilty and put her in jail. She would then be unable to campaign for parliament in 2012 (which, I suspect, was the goal from the beginning). This course would, however, be viewed in Ukraine and the rest of the world as political revenge and would further isolate the Yanukovych regime.

2. They can find her guilty and suspend her sentence. This would prevent her from standing in the election for parliament, but wouldn’t prevent her from campaigning. She could then easily make the campaign about the human rights, free speech and corruption record of the regime and the Party of Regions. Her own “guilt” would only help her party’s ratings.

3. They can acquit her. While this option would certainly improve the regime’s image abroad, within Ukraine it would make the president look weak and ineffectual to his supporters, and would do nothing to win over his detractors. It would further strengthen Tymoshenko – who could then campaign as the only leader who can fight and beat the oppressive, corrupt system and the despotic president

I believe that the regime will choose the first option; this will, however, have serious consequences. It will show once and for all that the Yanukovych administration is committed to building an authoritarian Ukraine. Perhaps most dangerously for Yanukovych, it will have the effect of uniting the opposition, now fragmented, around Tymoshenko, much the way Kuchma’s attempted authoritarianism united the opposition around Yushchenko.

]]> http://ukrainewatch.wordpress.com/2011/08/03/the-trial-of-yulia-tymoshenko-or-how-to-paint-yourself-into-a-corner/feed/ 0 ukrwatch http://ukrainewatch.wordpress.com/2011/08/03/national-peculiarities-of-homophobia-in-ukraine/ http://ukrainewatch.wordpress.com/2011/08/03/national-peculiarities-of-homophobia-in-ukraine/#comments Thu, 04 Aug 2011 00:48:20 +0000 Ukraine Watch http://ukrainewatch.wordpress.com/?p=415 Read more]]> Tamara Martsenyuk, PhD in Sociology, Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology, National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

In Ukraine lately sexual identity issue is widely used to raise questions about morality, demography, and even national threat. One of the largest fighters “for moral cleanliness of the Ukrainian society and against propaganda of perversion” is so called “movement” Love against Homosexuality (LAH)[1]. Its leader, famous journalist Ruslan Kukharchuk in his blog in “Ukrainian Pravda”[2] provokes discussions based on hatred. Moreover, after All-Ukrainian Union “Council of LGBT Organisation of Ukraine” has been registered, LAH sent statement to President of Ukraine and Minister of Justice: “homosexuality is acquired phenomenon and it does not have genetic nature, its dissemination is caused by a number of factors, particularly by propaganda”[3]. According to LAH opinion, “dissemination of homosexuality contradicts national interests of Ukraine”, leads to HIV/AIDS dissemination, demographic crisis intensification, family institution destruction, narrowing of citizens’ constitutional rights, and freedom of religion elimination. The similar arguments against homosexuality are chosen by Party “Svoboda” that in December 2010 hold an action against homosexuality.[4]

Homosexuality and homosexual people are used as “common enemy” to unite young people and distract from urgent social issues, poverty, corruption, etc. In March 2011 protest against propaganda of homosexuality and juvenile justice has been conducted by Lviv NGOs and young people (students unions, Student government of Lviv and Student Mayor of Lviv).[5] Definitely, important economic and political issues for young people to protest!

Finally some Ukrainian politicians provided example of fight for “morality” of Ukrainian society and against “threat to national security.” While Ukraine had ratified numerous international and European legal acts on human rights, including UN Resolution on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, on June 20^th 2011 Members of Parliament have registered a draft Law “On Introduction of Changes to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine (Regarding Protection of Children Rights on the Safe Information Sphere)”, giving such rationale: “The draft law ….. is designed to strengthen protection from homosexual propaganda in Ukraine and establish the legal framework for the prosecution of violations of the laws which protect public order and morality in Ukrainian society. The spread of homosexuality is a threat to national security, as it leads to an epidemic of HIV / AIDS, destroys the institution of the family and can cause a demographic crisis.” The draft law seeks to achieve this objective through amendments of five laws addressing protection of public morals, regulation of the media/publishing, and the criminal code. In each case this is done through simply adding either “the promotion of homosexuality” or “the production/distribution of products which promote homosexuality” to the list of prohibited activities in the legislation.

Now it is difficult to say how much support the draft law will receive. MP members who worry a lot about “morality of society” may push it forward without any doubt. It will be considered first by the Parliamentary Committee on freedom of speech and information, and by the Scientific and Expert Department of the Parliament.  It would then go to a first hearing, probably in the autumn 2011. And in case the law is adopted it automatically strengthen the censorship making problematic even to teach at the University on gender and sexuality in courses on gender studies and violate LGBT rights in Ukraine.

International Day Against Homophobia Kherson Ukraine

Gas Politics Care of Guardian.co.uk

Photo Gas Politics Care of Guardian.co.uk

Although much has been said in the Ukrainian press about the trial of Yulia Tymoshenko, it is still unclear what she is on trial for. For abusing her executive powers as a Prime Minister when signing the gas agreements in 2009? Or for concluding, what the current government considers as disadvantageous, gas arrangements with Gazprom? In either case the accusations seem absurd. In the case of the abuse of powers, Ukrainian officials have abused public authority granted to them since independence. Thus, her selective prosecution does not make sense in a system where the courts are not independent and leads observers abroad to conclude that the trial is politically motivated. In regards to the gas agreements being disadvantageous, Tymoshenko had a different conception of the national interest than the current government, and without a clear definition in the Ukrainian laws of the ‘national interest’ one cannot try her for compliance.

Did she or didn’t she abuse her powers during this process? This question, however, rests on the assumption that what is legal or illegal in Ukraine can be clearly established, relying on the laws of Ukraine. Those of us who study Ukrainian politics know that neither the division of functions between various executive bodies nor the ‘Law of Ukraine’ are actually clear-cut. In addition, since independence existing laws have been used arbitrarily or simply ignored by successive governments and presidents. For example, consider two major international decisions made by the Ukrainian executive.

According to the Ukrainian constitution the parliament grants consent in relations to the binding character of international treaties, which means that international treaties, signed by the President of Ukraine, have to be ratified to be implemented. To avoid this immediate parliamentary approval that interfered with presidential foreign-policy making powers the executive frequently circumvented or delayed this procedure and opted for the signing of the most controversial international deals through intergovernmental agreements.

Examining the case of the Black Sea Fleet Accords in 1997, Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko signed accords with his Russian counterpart allowing for the division and subsequent basing of the Russian fleet on the Ukrainian territory in return for debt forgiveness and energy supplies. As argued by the opposition at the time, the deal betrayed the national interests of Ukraine, and should this agreement have been turned to the parliament for ratification, it would have certainly failed. The agreement was ratified post-factum in 1999 and linked to the inter-state Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership as a package, allowing little manoeuvre for the parliamentarians. Moreover, by 1999 ratification was a mere formality as the division was completed and most of the agreements that regulated the stationing of the fleet, compensation for Ukraine, and debt settlement were implemented. Thus, laws in this case were bended by the executive in order to resolve the issue.

Another telling example is the reversal of the Odesa-Brody pipeline in July 2004. At the time Prime Minister Yanukovych, removed the phrase “in the direction from Odesa to Brody” from the Cabinet’s earlier resolution, enabling the reversal of the oil flow. He made this amendment without the procedural involvement of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in contradiction to the resolution of the National Security and Defence Council. The exclusion together with the inter-governmental oil transportation agreement he signed with Russia enabled the shipment of Russian oil through the Brody-Odesa route for export, further increasing Ukraine’s dependence on Russian energy sources and supply routes instead of allowing the country to diversify and strengthen its energy security. One could argue that this was a betrayal of the national interests of Ukraine due to the obstruction of diversification efforts and hindrance to Ukraine’s European integration (a strategic goal of Ukraine set by the parliament). In this case the reversal was personal decision of the PM rather than a collegiate decision of the Cabinet of Ministers.

Both instances illustrate that legality in executive decision-making is a vague concept, partially due to the contradictions between some of the constitutional provisions and subsequent laws and procedures that were set to enable policy-making, and partially due to the inconsistent use of these procedures. The examples also show that various governments will have a different conception of what the national interest of Ukraine is in a given situation. Some view immediate financial benefits for the budget or specific sectors as a way to evaluate whether the deal is advantageous; some will have a more long-term and comprehensive view of the problem. The lack of clarity in the Ukrainian laws on what constitutes ‘national interests’ leaves us without a way to evaluate the righteousness of one’s actions. Thus, accusations that Tymoshenko’s decision was disadvantageous for Ukraine, begs the question of disadvantageous according to whom?

Tymoshenko’s goal in her energy policies has been to uproot the intermediaries in the energy trade in Ukraine. Since mid-1990s intermediaries like RosUkrEnergo created opportunities for corruption, removed profits that should have gone to state coffers, and prevented energy diversification, thus promulgating Ukraine’s energy dependence on Russia. Cutting this ‘umbilical cord’ might have been immediately painful for some of the Ukrainian industrial producers who benefit from ‘cheap’ energy, but in the long-term it would eradicate corruption and enrich the budget. In addition, the price of energy for these industrial producers would stop being subsidised by the Ukrainian taxpayer. In the short-term the termination of ‘cheap’ energy would inevitably eradicate inefficient enterprises from the market and in the long-term the policy would make the remaining industrial producers truly globally competitive. Consequently, Tymoshenko’s conception of the national interest can be best understood in this long-term view, whereas her opponents see it as disadvantageous due to the immediate constraints it imposed on the Ukrainian, mainly energy-intensive, industrial producers. One might disagree with her view, but you cannot put beliefs on trial.

Equally, prosecuting Tymoshenko for the abuse of powers while in the office is illogical in the current political system of Ukraine, because it is selective. Each and every politician in Ukraine has abused his/her powers while in office, sometime not even in the name of personal or vested interests but because the legislature is so inconsistent that it does not allow for efficient and effective policy-making. If one truly wanted to set the record straight, one would have to go all the way back to 1991 and audit uses and abuses of public authority over the last two decades. Yes, Ukraine’s rule of law has to be strengthened and improved, but not through the selective prosecution of political opponents. It is not the best strategy for receiving accountability and legitimacy. A better strategy is to clarify policy-making procedures and functions of the branches of government, and reform the judiciary to a democratic standard by establishing independent courts, due process, and law enforcement that consistently and apolitically protects the law. Such a step would provide a long term solution for the endemic problem of office abuse in Ukraine, while giving the regime legitimacy abroad and political benefits of a true reformer at home.

Students Protesting care of Canada.com

В Україні літо — це гаряча пора. Не тільки тому, що температура висока. Літом відбувається вступ до університетів. Абітурієнти мучаться із вибором навчального закладу та чергами на здачу документів до нього ж. Працівники університетів заклопотані збором документів та намаганням отримати більше бюджетних місць на навчання студентів. Студенти ж, як правило, на відпочинку — їм гаряче від сонця. Адже абітурієнтська метушня вже позаду.

Останнє літо, коли студенти не відпочивали, а протестували було аж у 2004 році. Президент Кучма вирішив об’єднати три університети в Сумах в один. Ректором мав бути президентський ставленик, який мав забезпечити перемогу провладного кандидата в президенти серед Сумських студентів.

В 2004 році студенти Сум, не зважаючи на літні канікули почали протест. Їх підтримали студенти з усієї України. Протест розпочався із початком канікул в червні. Перед закінченням канікул студенти перемогли. Кучма скасував свій указ. Тоді, в 2004 це показало, що кожен відстояти власну позицію.

Наступний масштабний студентський протест розпочався із призначенням міністром освіти одіозної персони — Дмитра Табачника. Під час навчального 2010-2011 року студенти практично постійно протестували проти політики нового міністра освіти Табачника. Міністерство стабільно давало приводи для протесту.

Ситуація не змінилася й улітку. Але тільки для міністра освіти. Він і надалі продовжив давати приводи для протесту. Цього разу Табачник вирішив помститися університетам, студенти яких були найбільш бунтівними — Києво-Могилянській академії та Львівському університетові ім. І. Франка.

Маніпулюючи темою необхідності скорочення кількості студентів, Табачник власноруч скоротив кількість місць для майбутніх студентів (http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/news/2011/07/110711_education_cuts_rl.shtml). У Львівському університеті аж вдвічі більше ніж в інших університетах (http://centre7.org.ua/article/derzhzamovlennya_yak_instrument_tysku_na_demokratychni_universytety).

Крім скорочення кількості майбутніх громадсько-активних студентів, скорочення кількості місць означає і скорочення професорського складу. Табачник проти автономії університетів і кількість працівників міністерство жорстко прив’язує до кількості студентів. Міністрові освіти йдеться про те, щоб максимально знешкодити волелюбні університети.

Але не це є найбільшою проблемою. Проблемою виявилося готовність студентів встати на захист власних університетів. Наразі виглядає, що запевнення студентських лідерів вперто відстоювати свої ідеї (http://education.unian.net/ukr/detail/190921, http://education.unian.net/ukr/detail/191106) не спрацювали.

Після публічних заяв ректора Львівського університету (http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/news/2011/07/110713_vakarchuk_interview_rl.shtml) та Президента Києво-Могилянської академії (http://education.unian.net/ukr/detail/191049) жодного студентського протесту не відбулося.

Важко визначити, що є причиною відсутності готовності студентів встати на захист свої університетів. Чи це відсутність почуття солідарності із власними університетами, чи це не розуміння простого факту, що їхня активна позиція проти міністра освіти також спричинилася до атаки на університети.

Можливо міністр освіти оптимістично припускає, що нарешті студенти видохлися і більше неспроможні протестувати проти наступу на їхні університети. Ми ж будемо сподіватися, що виною всьому незвично холодне літо. Напевне це постійні дощі охолоджують гарячі студентські серця і не дають їм бути відповідальними перед університетами частиною яких вони є.

Cold summer of education – 2011

In Ukraine, summer — is a hot time. Not only because of the high temperatures. Summer is time for joining the university world. It has been a time for student action. But this year the summer is cold. Employees of universities scramble, gathering the documents and attempt to get more funds to budget places for future students. The students seem to be hiding.

Hot summers in the city in the past
Summers ago, students were not resting, but protesting in 2004. President Kuchma reacted and decided to unite three universities in Sumy into one. The Rector was to be a presidential protégé, who had to ensure the victory of pro-presidential candidate in Presidential election among students of Sumy. The students of Sumy, despite the summer vacation began to protest. Their protest was supported by students from all over Ukraine. The protest began with the start of vacation in June. Before the vacation finished, students had won. Kuchma reversed his decree. In 2004 we proved that everybody can defend their interests.

It was a warmer winter?
The next large-scale student protests began with the appointment of Minister of Education – Dmytro Tabachnyk. During the 2010-2011 academic year, students almost continuously protested against the policies of the new minister. The situation has not changed this summer. The minister still continued to give reasons for student activism. This time the Ministry decided to take revenge on universities whose students were the most rebellious – Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv .

Manipulating the financial need to reduce the number of students, Tabachnyk reduced seating capacity for future students in both universities at rates more then double in other universities. (http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/news/2011/07/110711_education_cuts_rl.shtml). (http://centre7.org.ua/article/derzhzamovlennya_yak_instrument_tysku_na_demokratychni_universytety).

In addition reducing the number of student seats also means a reduction of the professors at these particular Universities. The number of employees of the each university is strictly tied to the number of students. Minister of Education wants to neutralize the most liberal democratic-freedom-loving universities.

Cooling off : Where are the students?
Yet, this is not the biggest problem. The problem was students’ lack willingness to stand up for their own universities. The student leaders attempts defend their ideas did not work . (http://education.unian.net/ukr/detail/190921, http://education.unian.net/ukr/detail/191106)

Even after the public statements and calls of the Rector of the Lviv University and President of Kyiv Mohyla Academy) no student protests occurred. (http://education.unian.net/ukr/detail/191049) (http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/news/2011/07/110713_vakarchuk_interview_rl.shtml

It is difficult to determine what is causing the lack of willingness of students to stand up for their universities. Is this lack of solidarity with their own universities, or not understanding the simple fact that their active position against the Minister of Education also contributed to the attack on universities.

Perhaps the Minister of Education optimistically assumes that the students finally unable to protest against the attack on their universities. We hope for an end to unusually cold summer. Perhaps the rain cooled the hot student heart.